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ABSTRACT 
Transportation project prioritization uses performance measures that are related to the transportation asset, its 
operations, and its environment. However, in the state of practice, evaluation does not consider directly the 
likelihood of natural or man-made threats, the infrastructure resilience, or the consequences of the infrastructure 
damage in the event that the threat occurs. Thus, during the prioritization of investments, assets of low security 
do not receive the due attention they deserve. In defining security as the lack of risk of damage from threats due 
to inherent structure or functional resilience, this paper is based on the premise that the inclusion of security 
considerations in prioritization introduces a much needed element of robustness in investment prioritization 
However, the inclusion of investment security impacts leads to an increase in the number of performance 
measures for the investment evaluation. This paper presents a methodology to quantify the overall security level 
for an asset in terms of the environmental threats it faces, its resilience or vulnerability to damage, and the 
consequences of the infrastructure damage. The overall framework consists of the traditional steps in risk 
management, and this paper's specific contribution is in the part of the framework that measures the risk. This 
paper applies the methodology to a given set of assets by measuring the risk (security) of each asset and 
prioritizing security investments across multiple assets using multiple criteria analysis. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Disasters can result in millions and even billions of 
dollars in damage. For example, Hurricane Sandy 
caused about $50 billion in damages, and the 
tsunami in Japan caused about $308 billion in 
damages (Porter, 2013; Ridgwell, 2011). Additionally, 
events such as the Paramount Boulevard Bridge 
accident in California cost $40 million in damages 
and repair, and the Leo Frigo Memorial Bridge Pier 
failure cost $20 million in investigation and repair 
costs (Tata, 2012; Phelps, 2013). The occurrence 
and magnitude of these unexpected natural or man-
made disasters cannot be predicted with absolute 
certainty; however, if civil infrastructure systems can 
be made to withstand better the potential damage 
resulting from these disasters, the consequences 
and costs of repair may be reduced.  
Similar to all civil infrastructure systems, 
transportation assets encounter end-of-life situations 
when they face intended or unintended agents that 
cause their destruction. Unintended termination can 
be caused by the failure of the asset itself due to 
factors including design flaws, fatigue, advanced 
deterioration, and other internal causes, or due to 
external agents such as overloading, accidents, or 
natural events. Intended end-of-life events include 
deliberate retirement due to structural or functional 
obsolescence, terrorism, or vandalism. In any given 
jurisdiction, there is a wide range of types of threats 
to transportation infrastructure; however, if such 
threats to each asset can be identified and if the 
expected reduction in the asset damage due to 
security-enhancing investments can be predicted, 
then the reduction in the consequences of disaster 
can be forecast for each type of level of the security 
investment. When infrastructure is made resilient 
through security investments, the consequences of 
unintended end-of-life events can be reduced and 
the infrastructure itself can play a role in mitigating or 
recovering from the damage resulting from the 
event. 
There are five key steps to risk management that 
should be considered to develop evidence for 
security investments (Ezell, Farr, Wiese, 2000): 
 Measure the threat likelihood posed by 
external or intentional threats to the asset 
 Monitor the threat likelihood over time 
 Assess the effectiveness of actions intended 
to reduce consequences 
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 Communicate this information to the general 
public and legislators 
 Provide evidence for appropriate resources 
With the listed series of steps, a methodology to 
quantify security enhances the list to ensure security 
is of equal importance with respect to other 
performance measures and further plays a key role 
in determining asset prioritization for security 
funding. 
Of the five key steps in risk management for 
reducing the overall negative impacts of 
transportation infrastructure damage, the first step is 
to measure the threat likelihood posed by forces 
external to the asset. If historical data such as 
earthquake occurrence or flooding tendency are 
available, then (1) these threat probabilities can be 
calculated to identify the areas of high threat 
likelihood, (2) the threat likelihood can be monitored 
over time to identify the optimal time of intervention, 
and (3) the effectiveness of asset improvements can 
be assessed in terms of the extent to which they can 
reduce the adverse consequences if the threat does 
occur. The fourth step involves communicating the 
gathered information to serve as support material for 
requesting funding purposely for investments geared 
toward securing the infrastructure from damage. 
With these steps, a case can be made to help 
improve transportation infrastructure in terms of 
security. 
Furthermore, due to the uncertain nature of threats 
(their occurrence and magnitudes cannot be 
predicted with complete certainty [Dojutrek, 2014]), it 
is vital to incorporate concepts of uncertainty in any 
analysis that deals with risk prediction and security 
investment evaluation. Failure to consider 
uncertainty can lead to overestimation or 
underestimation of the likelihood of the threat, 
damage to the infrastructure, and consequences of 
the damage to the community. Uncertainty can be 
quantified by analyzing historical data trends and 
developing models for threat likelihoods and 
magnitudes, infrastructure damage due to the threat, 
resilience enhancement due to the security 
investments, and community consequences of threat 
occurrence.  
At the current time, the funding allocation processes 
for transportation infrastructure at most agencies 
utilize performance measures that include the 
expected change in asset condition or remaining life, 
land use, air quality, connectivity, and so on. 
However, the impacts of competing investments on 
asset security are rarely considered in a direct 
manner. Thus, for assets that are located in an area 
of high threat likelihood, their respective proposed 
investments could help reduce the potential for 
infrastructure damage (and the consequent adverse 
impacts on the community). Current evaluation 
processes do not account for such beneficial impacts 
of the investments. As such, it is reasonable to argue 
that a performance measure that quantifies the 
security benefits (reduction of infrastructure damage 
risk due to external threats) should be considered in 
transportation investment evaluation and 
prioritization in general.   
2. A REVIEW OF PAST WORK 
Threat, vulnerability, and consequence information 
are important in risk assessment. Risk management 
includes a specification of which protective 
measures must be undertaken based on an agreed 
upon risk reduction strategy. The security industry 
has been slow to use measurable factors in reducing 
risk because of difficulties in establishing security-
related metrics. As such, in the security industry, the 
most widely-used approaches to analyze risks are 
qualitative in nature in a bid to ensure that the lower-
valued assets receive due consideration during the 
evaluation process. Typically, qualitative assessment 
assigns relative values to specific assets based on 
factors such as the criticality of loss or replacement 
costs. The threats against assets are also given a 
relative value based on the probability of taking 
place. The result is a risk equation that computes 
risk as a function of impact and likelihood of 
occurrence. The goal of a security design strategy 
should be the logical and incremental “buy down” of 
security risk so as to provide acceptable levels of 
protection for transportation agency assets and 
operations on a continuing basis (SAIC & PB 
Consult, 2009). 
The American Association of State Highway and 
Transportation Officials (AASHTO) Vulnerability 
Assessment method is a guide developed 
specifically for transportation agencies to establish a 
vulnerability assessment method based on 
AASHTO’s guidelines. The methodology focuses on 
subjectively assigning values to factors associated 
with asset criticality and vulnerability. Asset criticality 
and vulnerability scores are transformed into X and Y 
coordinates, respectively, and plotted to determine 
asset importance. Examples of criticality factors 
range from Deter/Defend Factors to Consequence to 
General Public Factors (AASHTO, 2002). Assets are 
then prioritized based on the subjective values 
assigned to each factor using the equation below.  
ܥݎ݅ݐ݈݅ܿܽ݅ݐݕ	ܥ݋݋ݎ݀݅݊ܽݐ݁	ሺܺሻ ൌ ൬ ݔܥ௠௔௫൰ ∙ 100 
Where x is the total criticality score for asset n, and 
Cmax is the highest criticality score attainable. 
Vulnerability in the AASHTO vulnerability 
assessment is broken into three factors: Visibility and 
Attendance, Access to the Asset, and Site Specific 
Hazards (AASHTO, 2002). Each factor is broken into 
32 
two subfactors and again given subjective values on 
a scale of one to five. The subfactors for each main 
factor are then multiplied together, and those results 
are added together as seen in the equation below. 
ܸݑ݈݊݁ݎܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕ	ܨܽܿݐ݋ݎ	ሺݕሻ ൌ ሺܣ ∙ ܤሻ ൅ ሺܥ ∙ ܦሻ ൅ ሺܧ ∙ ܨሻ 
Where A and B are subfactors of Factor 1, C and D 
are subfactors of Factor 2, and E and F are 
subfactors of Factor 3. 
A vulnerability coordinate is derived for each asset 
using the equation below.  
ܸݑ݈݊݁ݎܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕ	ܥ݋݋ݎ݀݅݊ܽݐ݁	ሺܻሻ ൌ ൬ ݕ
௠ܸ௔௫
൰ ∙ 100 
Where Vmax is the highest attainable vulnerability 
score and y is the vulnerability total score for asset n. 
The assets are then plotted in the coordinate system 
seen in Figure 1 and assets falling in Quadrant 1 of 
the graph are labeled high priority.  
In Figure 1, the Consequence Assessment is 
assumed on the basis of the X and Y coordinates 
and their factors and subfactors. The method 
continues by listing possible countermeasures 
broken down into countermeasure functions of deter, 
detect, and defend to be considered for the assets 
that fall in Quadrant 1. Again, choosing 
countermeasures is a subjective process based on 
the countermeasure functions and decision maker. 
Finally, the countermeasures listed are assigned 
rankings of high, medium, or low. 
The above-explained AASHTO methodology for risk 
management is quite subjective and uses surveys to 
obtain data (Venna & Fricker, 2009). Additionally, 
vulnerability and criticality are the only major factors 
that are included in the method to determine asset 
security importance, other important considerations, 
such as the resilience of the infrastructure, are not 
considered. Further, the method defines vulnerability 
and criticality as separate entities; however, one 
could argue that the concepts are not independent: if 
an asset is vulnerable then it has high criticality, and 
vice versa. 
The CARVER + Shock methodology identifies seven 
vulnerability factors (criticality, accessibility, 
recoverability, vulnerability, effect, recognizability, 
and shock) and subjectively assigns a value on a 
scale of zero to ten to each, then the overall score is 
calculated as the sum of the scores assigned to the 
seven criteria (NIICIE, 2007). It accounts for target 
components of the target system and is applicable to 
features outside of transportation. This methodology 
is popular as local governments seek to leverage 
simple analysis tools to derive security-related 
information. It provides a “quick and dirty” means to 
rank potential targets based on vulnerability.  
 




Figure 2. Proposed methodology framework 
However, McGill and Ayyub (2007) pointed out that 
its additive and inherently nonprobabilistic nature 
does not produce results that can support security 
risk assessment. 
The Costing Asset Protection for Transportation 
Agencies (CAPTA) method identifies security-related 
countermeasures for assets on the basis of the 
extent of potential losses (SAIC & PB Consult, 
2009). CAPTA uses a consequence-based 
methodology that supports capital budgeting and 
resource allocation. The main purpose of the method 
is to reduce risks to a level manageable by operating 
agencies based on their available budget and 
resources. Consequence thresholds are established 
subjectively for the risk factors that include the 
potentially exposed population, property loss, and 
mission disruption. This method is mainly a decision 
informing tool for capital budgeting, not necessarily 
an asset specific assessment tool for prioritizing 
assets (SAIC & PB Consult, 2009).  
3. METHODOLOGY 
The proposed security rating developed in this study 
has three main inputs: Threat Likelihood, Resilience, 
and Consequence. The output is a security rating 
index which will be used to help in prioritizing assets 
for optimal security enhancement funding and used 
in multicriteria evaluation (Figure 2 [Dojutrek, 2014]).  
 
Threat 








Table 1. Terminology for methodology  
Risk 
Factors Term Definition  
Asset 
Target 
Transportation asset that 
has value to the owner or 
users  
Resilience The ability of the asset to withstand the threat  
Threat 
Threat 
An unexpected natural, 
unintentional man-made 
or intentional man-made 
event that causes 
damage or disruption  
Threat 
Likelihood 




The loss of an asset and 
the effect of such loss to 
the community 
 
The definitions of the key inputs and terminology used 
in the paper are defined in Table 1 (Dojutrek, 2014). 
Each of the three main factors, Threat Likelihood, 
Resilience, and Consequence, have measures that 
quantify how much the factor contributes to asset 
security. Each measure is further broken into attributes 
that indicate the level of the measure rated on a scale to 
define the overall amount that the measure contributes 
to the factor (Dojutrek, 2014). Since the attributes of 
each measure have different units, the attribute data 
was scaled to account for these differences.  
Each risk factor follows the formulation below: 
ܨ௙ ൌ ݓଵ ∙ ܯଵ ൅⋯൅ ݓ௡ ∙ ܯ௡ 
f = 1….f 
n = 1…n 
Where Ff is a risk factor for the transportation asset, 
wn is the weight/importance of measure n, and Mn is 
a measure of risk factor Ff. 
Each measure of a risk factor follows the formulation 
below: 
ܯ௡ ൌ ݏଵ ∙ …	∙ ݏ௦௦ܰ  
Where Mn is a measure of risk factor Ff; ss is an 
attribute that contributes to the level of measure Mn, 
rated on a scale to define the overall amount that 
measure n contributes to the risk factor, Ff; and Ns is 
the number of attributes associated with measure n.  
The security rating function can take any one of 
several forms. For example, addition, subtraction, 
multiplication, or ratio. Also, there are several ways by 
which they can be weighted. For purposes of this 
study, the security rating equation is shown below.  
ܴܵ௔ ൌ
ܨோೌఈ
൫ܨ்௅ೌఋ ൅ ܨ஼ೌఒ ൯
 
 
Figure 3. Threat likelihood factor versus resilience factor 
 
 
Figure 4. Consequence factor versus resilience factor 
 
 
Figure 5. Threat likelihood factor versus consequence factor 
Where SRa is the Security Rating for asset a, FTLa is 
the threat likelihood factor of asset a, α is the 
exponential weight of the resilience factor, FCa is the 
consequence factor of asset a, δ is the exponential 
weight of the threat likelihood factor, FRa is the 
resilience factor of asset a, and λ is the exponential 
weight of the consequence factor. 
As asset resilience increases and threat likelihood 
and consequences decrease, the security rating 
increases. The greater the security rating, the more 
secure the asset is. Each factor can be graphed 
against each other to identify assets of importance 





Figure 6. 3-D representation of security rating factor 
 
Figure 7. JFK Bridge, Jeffersonville, Indiana 
 
Figure 8. Detailed framework for case study 
Additionally, a three-dimensional representation can 
also be derived from the three factors to show their 
interactions (Figure 6). 
4. CASE STUDY 
To demonstrate the study methodology, the National 
Bridge Inventory structure nr. 8868, the JFK Bridge 
in Jeffersonville, Indiana, was used (Figure 7). 
The factors, measures, and attributes used for the 
case study are described in Figure 8. 
The case study incorporated a number of 
assumptions. First, the construction time was based 
on the bridge size. Second, earthquakes were 
identified as the threat, and the probability of 
earthquake threat was equal to the amount of 
historical earthquake epicenters found in the county 
of location. Third, environmental barriers were 
assumed to be the waterway under the bridge. The  
 
Table 2. JFK Bridge threat likelihood factor data 
Measure 







Env Barriers Over river 3 4.5 
 
















Precipitation 45.84 5 
 
Table 3. JFK Bridge resilience factor data 
Measure  Attributes  Data  Scaled  Res-
ults







Age  83 yrs  4  
Recovera-
bility  
Const. Time  2yrs  4  41.
67 
Const. Cost  $45.2M  5  




Material  Continuous 
steel  
3  3.5  




detour travel speed was assumed to be 45 mph, and 
all weights in the security rating equation (α, δ, λ) and 
in the risk factor equations were assumed to be equal.  
Threat likelihood measures, attributes, and scales 
can be seen in Table 2.  
ܨ்௅ ൌ 0.5 ∙ 3 ൅ 0.5 ∙ 2.33 ൌ 2.67 
Where FTL is the threat likelihood risk factor.  
The threat likelihood factor was calculated to be 
2.67. The resilience measures, attributes, and scales 
are listed in Table 3. The resilience factor was 
calculated to be 19.2. 
ܨோ ൌ 0.33 ∙ 12 ൅ 0.33 ∙ 41.67 ൅ 0.33 ∙ 3.5 ൌ 19.2 
Where FR is the resilience risk factor.  
The consequence measures, attributes, and scales 
are listed in Table 4. The consequence factor was 
calculated to be 4.29. 
35 
Table 4. JFK Bridge consequence factor data 










3  3  




ent Cost  
$36.1M  4  8  
EDMC 
Value  












4.15 min  2  
 
 
Figure 9. Tentative security rating scale 
 
Table 5. Interpretation of security rating 
Security 
Rating  
Example Interpretation  
≤ 0.21  Indicates a great need for security improvement of the 
asset. The asset has generally very low security thus 
immediate action should be undertaken to enhance its 
resilience and thus to reduce the possible 
consequences of threats.  
0.25 – 
0.21 
Indicates significant need for security improvement 
needs of the asset. For this asset, the agency should be 
poised to undertake actions in the very near future, to 
enhance resilience and thus to reduce possible 
consequences of the asset failure.  
0.40–
0.25 
Indicates medium-to-high security improvement needs. 
Facilities within this range can be monitored at a 
frequency slightly exceeding standard frequency. The 
risk of failure can be tolerated until a normal capital 
project (to enhance resilience and thus reduce 
consequences, among other benefits) is carried out.  
0.95–
0.40  
Indicates low-to-medium security improvement needs. 
Unexpected failure can be avoided during the remaining 
service life of the asset by performing standard 
scheduled inspections with due attention to specific 




Indicates low security improvement need. Often 
reflective of the likelihood of threat to a civil engineering 
system built to the current design standards in a low 
threat likelihood environment.  
11–3.03 Indicates little or zero security improvement needs.  
 
 
Figure 10. Spatial representation of overall risks for a section of 
Indiana bridges using security rating 
 
ܨ஼ ൌ 0.33 ∙ 3 ൅ 0.33 ∙ 8 ൅ 0.33 ∙ 2 ൌ 4.29 
Where FC is the consequence risk factor.  
The overall Security Rating of the JFK Bridge is then 
3.03, which indicates a security rating of “medium”: 
ܵ ௃ܴி௄ ൌ 19.2
ଵ
ሺ2.67ଵ ൅ 4.29ଵሻ ൌ 2.76 
The security rating can be placed on a tentative 
scale and interpretations made, as seen in Figure 9 
and Table 5.  
Spatial analysis can be carried out to further 
enhance visualization of the security rating (see 
Figure 10, produced using GIS ArcMap 10.1).  
5. SECURITY INVESTMENT AND 
PRIORITIZATION  
Multicriteria decision making uses any of several 
alternative methods, including cost effectiveness, 
economic efficiency, the factor rating method, or the 
analytic hierarchy process. The cost effectiveness 
can be measured in terms of the increase in security 
rating or postproject security rating due to a security 
investment (Dojutrek, 2014). Economic efficiency 
can be calculated using the net present value, 
present worth of costs, or the benefit cost ratio. The 
factor rating method ranks different criteria based on 
subjective weighting. The analytic hierarchy process 
uses matrix multiplication of criteria weights to each 
alternative weight to derive the best option.  
The evaluation criteria for security investment 
involve certain specific considerations. Effectiveness 
can be measured by increased infrastructure 
resilience and/or decreased consequences 
(Dojutrek, 2014). Costs can be measured in terms of 
agency costs (damage costs and repair costs) and 
user costs (travel time increase and detours). To 
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measure security, the security rating described in this 
paper can be used for infrastructure as is, as an 
increase in security rating after security 
improvements and as a final security rating after 
improvements have been done (Dojutrek, 2014).  
To incorporate the security rating into multicriteria 
evaluation as a performance measure, the security 
rating can be used for the asset in its current state 
as a generic performance measure that is the same 
for each project alternative (Table 6), as an “increase 
in security rating” that is alternative-specific and 
different for each proposed improvement (Table 7), 
and as a “final security rating” which is again 
alternative-specific and based on the enhancement 
to security that the improvement provides (Table 8). 
Each of these methods will prioritize security 
improvement alternatives based on the specific 
performance measure chosen.  
The existing security rating prioritization indicates 
assets with low security rating scores to be of high 
importance and, therefore, in need of improvements. 
In the example in Table 6, Asset 2, with the lowest 
security rating, would be prioritized for further 
improvement needs.  
The increase in security rating prioritization indicates 
the asset and associated alternative improvement 
with the greatest increase in security for an asset. In 
the example in Table 7, Asset 2 would be the most 
beneficial choice because of the alternative’s high 
increase in security rating for the asset.  
The final security rating prioritization indicates the 
asset and alternative with the greatest security rating 
after an improvement. In the example in Table 8, 
Asset 3 would be the alternative that gives the 
overall highest security rating after improvement.  
Additionally, security can be incorporated into 
multicriteria evaluation by including security as one 
of the various performance measures used to 
evaluate transportation infrastructure. Example 
performance measure criteria are listed below. 
Traditionally, the performance measures that are 
used in evaluation include: air quality, noise, 
economic efficiency, economic development, travel 
time, safety, vehicle operating cost, and connectivity. 
This paper argues that it is feasible and reasonable 
to add security as one of the multiple criteria in 
transportation investment evaluation, prioritization, 
and decision making. Secondly, for transportation 
investments specifically geared towards security 
enhancement, the framework presented in this paper 
could be used; for doing this, both the costs and the 
benefits (or effectiveness, in terms of the security 
rating increase) of the security project should be 
estimated. This paper addressed the benefits 
perspective. 





Priority Rank on the Basis of 
Existing Security Rating  
Asset 1  3.22 2 
Asset 2 2.45 1 
Asset 3  5.65 3 
Asset 4  7.40 5 
Asset 5  10.23 6 
Asset 6  6.89 4 
 
Table 7. Simple example of increase in security rating 
prioritization  













2.45 8.30 1 1 
Asset 3 Bridge Rehabilitation 5.65 7.22 3 2 
Asset 4 Bridge Painting 7.40 0.52 5 6 





6.89 4.88 4 3 
1ESR: Existing Security Rating; ISR: Increase in Security Rating 
 
Table 8. Simple example of final security rating prioritization 


























Rehabilitation 5.65 7.22 12.87 3 2 1 
Asset 










6.89 4.88 11.77 4 3 2 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
Prioritization of transportation assets typically utilizes 
performance measures related to asset 
characteristics, operations, and surrounding 
environment. The environmental criteria generally do 
not take into consideration asset security which can 
be stated as a function of the likelihood and 
magnitude, resilience of the transportation asset, 
and the resulting consequence in the event of the 
treat. Therefore, low security assets do not receive 
the due consideration they deserve during project 
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prioritization. This paper presented a methodology to 
quantify the overall security level for an asset, using 
a case study, in terms of the threat likelihood, system 
resilience, and consequences in the event of system 
destruction or damage due to the threat occurrence. 
The paper's methodology addresses the risk 
measurement aspect of the traditional risk 
management framework. The paper applies the 
methodology to measure the security of a prominent 
transportation asset in Indiana. Finally, the paper 
shows how security rating can be used in multiple 
criteria investment evaluation for multiple assets. 
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